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ABSTRACT
Sharing provenance across workflow management systems auto-
matically is not currently possible, but the value of such a capa-
bility is high since it could greatly reduce the amount of dupli-
cated workflows, accelerate the discovery of new knowledge, and
verify the integrity of past and present analyses. Although numer-
ous technological challenges exist to efficiently share provenance
information across workflow management systems, permissioned
distributed ledgers could surmount many of them. The primary
benefit of permissioned distributed ledgers over other technologies
is that their distribution is over a peer-to-peer network that en-
codes transactions across the network into an immutable hash list
and achieves consensus on the validity of the new data through a
common consensus mechanism. This work discusses provenance
and distributed ledgers on their own and then presents an argu-
ment that distributed ledgers naturally satisfy many of the require-
ments of workflow provenance, that provenance information can
exist in the ledger in multiple ways, and that a number of novel
research areas exist based on this strategy.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Consider the following statement about the provenance of a piece
of data A:
A was generated using linear regression on B and
stored in file C yesterday.
Provenance capture as it pertains to information, in this case A, is
the process of collecting metadata about the creation, manipula-
tion, and use of that information. This is important when the his-
tory of A needs to be trusted and verified or in situations where A
needs to be reused or reproduced reliably. The provenance in this
case describes how Awas generated (linear regression), what data
it was generated from (B), where it was stored (C), the nature of
that storage (a file), and when these things occurred (yesterday).
The previous example could also be taken as a description of
a very basic scientific workflow describing how to manipulate B
to generate A and stage the results in file C . The overlap is this
close only in the most basic examples. One key difference between
these perspectives is that the workflow description is executable
in some workflow management system, but the provenance is a
persistent record about that workflow. Over time the provenance
trail for A might also encompass workflows across many execu-
tions or multiple workflow management systems and have addi-
tional preservation requirements. This conceptual proximity leads
many workflow management systems to include complete work-
flow descriptions in provenance records, and some workflow man-
agement systems can recreate and execute workflows from their
provenance records alone.
However, one significant problem for provenance as it relates
to scientific workflows it that there are no standard ways to share
it. Although some workflow management systems provide inte-
grated provenance repositories, the practice is not universal and
the provenance repositories might not be designed with other sys-
tems in mind. What if a highly cited publication relied on results
generated from a scientific workflow that could be reproduced quickly
if its full history was available? Furthermore, what if it were possi-
ble to compute new and equally significant results in record time
by using the history to generate a new workflow description with
minor modifications to the original? Both of these may be rela-
tively simple to accomplish in a single, well-designed workflow
management system that captures provenance, but there is no read-
ily available general-purpose solution.
This work argues that a permissioned distributed ledger is an ef-
ficient solution to share workflow provenance between networked
peers. The distributed ledgerwould act as the broker between peers
to execute workflows as transactions on the network, and each
transaction would be recorded in the ledger as usual. The act of
recording the transactions would, in effect, be capturing the root
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node of the provenance graph, which would be augmented by ad-
ditional information stored in the transaction record to point to
system-specific provenance information. The benefits to this are
that transactions in distributed ledgers are (1) shared across the
network to establish consensus on their validity and (2) made im-
mutable by encoding the state in a distributed hash list, which in-
sures integrity. Trust among peers is established by cryptographic
keys in permissioned ledgers (as opposed to proof ofwork schemes),
so only minor resources are required to join the network.
The remainder of this article investigates this possibility. Sec-
tion 2 provides a general overview of provenance as well as the
basics behind distributed ledgers. Section 3 presents the case for
using distributed ledgers for this purpose in more detail.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Workflow Provenance
The issues around provenance for workflows, including scientific
workflows, have been thoroughly investigated elsewhere in the lit-
erature. Data provenance for workflows has been investigated par-
ticularly thoroughly in the data science community, (c.f. [8]).Work-
flow management systems for modeling and simulation capture
provenance as well, but some do so by explicitly generating graph-
based provenance [13], while others follow a “log everything” style
[7].
Multiple provenance standards exist, most of which are appli-
cable to problems in broader scientific domains as well as work-
flow science. The PROV Model, for example, is a standard for cap-
turing provenance developed as a successor to the Open Prove-
nance Model [3] [11]. In PROV, provenance is modeled with a data
model, PROV-DM, and can be stored in XML, RDF, Dublin Core,
and a human-readable form for examples. Constraints can also
be applied using the PROV-CONSTRAINTS module. Provenance
is stored in a tree in PROV, and the data model includes entities,
activities, usage, generation, time, and other elements.
In tree-based provenance models such as PROV, provenance is
captured in a tree beginning with an element, usually an entity,
at the root node. Entities are normally the root node because they
are often the end product or are used as the source to generate
other data. Depending on the model, the element at the root node
will be either the initial element or the final entity. For example,
PROV roots the provenance tree in the final created entity, and
edges in the tree indicate usage or generation going backwards in
time from the end to the beginning. This is a natural representa-
tion when considering the question “Where did this element come
from?”; whereas a time-forward perspective is natural when con-
sidering the question “What did this element become or produce?”
Activities in tree-based provenance models are models as nodes,
like entities.
Event-based or “log everything” provenance models provide de-
tailed provenance information based on logs created from events
in the system. Workflow management systems can easily generate
this type of provenance trail as the workflow is executed (which is
why it was chosen in [7]). As the workflow is executed, the input
and output are captured at each step, as well as a description of or
the entire instruction set, and logged. The entire workflow descrip-
tionmight be saved as well. Information on activities, entities, time,
and other elements can be captured just like a tree-based prove-
nancemodel. The provenance information ismost commonly avail-
able in the form of logs but might be generated as separate prove-
nance reports in some systems. Although it is conceivable that a
provenance trail in an event-based system could be ordered from
with time running backwards, like all event-based systems it is
much more common to find a time-forward representation. Some
systems, including those in [7] and [6], can use this type of prove-
nance record to enable “fast replays” of workflows.
2.2 Distributed Ledgers
Distributed ledgers are linked collections of records about trans-
actions that are distributed across a peer-to-peer network without
any central authority. The Blockchain data structure that forms
the basis of the BitCoin cryptocurrency is the most well-known
implementation of a distributed ledger [12]. Records, or groups of
records called Blocks, are linked in order through a hash list where
each item is linked to the one before and after it through a unique
hash of the record(s), forming a “chain.” Without a central author-
ity to certify the validity of records, the means of determining con-
sensus on whether or not records are valid requires the use of a
consensus algorithm executed by nodes in the network. The ex-
act algorithm used depends on whether or not the ledger is open
or permissioned. Open networks, such as cryptocurrencies, tend
to determine consensus through proof-of-work algorithms [12] or
through proof of stake [5].
The basic operation of a distributed ledger is as follows, assum-
ing an underlying Blockchain implementation:
• A transaction is executed on the network between entities
A and B to create an asset C .
• The transaction is time-stamped and added to a collection
of unverified transactions, which are linked to previously
verified transactions through a hash.
• A check (such as proof of work) is executed on the collected
transactions to ascertain their validity.
• Themajority of nodes in the remainder of the network comes
to a consensus on the result of the check as presented by the
original node or nodes that checked the collection.
• The collection is accepted, and its hash is used for the next
collection; the process is then repeated.
The most appealing features of distributed ledgers are that a
central authority is not required and that the combination of con-
sensus algorithms and a hash list (or hash tree) to verify and store
the transactions creates a very reliable system. Because of this, dis-
tributed ledgers have found application in cryptocurrencies, tradi-
tional financial markets, and many other areas [1] [4]. The appli-
cability of Blockchain to business process modeling has also been
investigated [9].
2.2.1 Permissioned versus OpenNetworks. Open networksmust
use proof-based algorithms to establish trust because members of
the network are inherently untrustworthy. Thus, by providing proof
that is acceptable to a majority of the remaining network, nodes
can be added to the list. Since the proof might be computation-
ally expensive, cryptocurrencies provide the incentive of receiving
coins in the currency appropriate to the work.
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If the primary motivation of such a costly proof scheme is to cre-
ate trust between untrustworthy parties, one obvious alternative
is to work only with trustworthy nodes. Permissioned networks
are formed by nodes identified by strong cryptographic keys and
allowed to join by permission of other members in the network.
Reaching consensus in this situation is as simple as making sure
that the source of the transaction and its purpose are valid between
some parties on the network. No incentive is required to check
transactions and vouch for them in this case beyond membership
in the network, which improves performance and alleviates any
concern about the work, stake, or cost required to participate.
2.2.2 Smart Contracts. A smart contract, or simply a contract,
in this context is a small piece of code that is executed in response
to a transaction. Business logic executed on the network is done so
through contracts. Contracts can have many uses, although some
ledgers may limit the type of code that can be executed for either
architectural reasons or security.
2.2.3 Relationship to other technologies. There are number of
technologies closely related to distributed ledgers. Blockchain data
structures are implemented usingMerkle trees [10] as are other dis-
tributed databases and version control systems, such as Git. There
is also substantial on-going work to improve on the performance
of distributed ledgers and Blockchains in particular. For example,
the PHANTOM protocol, based on BlockDAG, alleviates many of
the performance issues that are side effects of Nakamoto’s origi-
nal consensus scheme and allows for asynchronous, fast block cre-
ation. Other efforts are also investigating the use of Blockchain
technologies for provenance capture [14][15].
3 DISTRIBUTED LEDGERS FORWORKFLOW
PROVENANCE
The promise of a permissioned ledger formanagingworkflow prove-
nance is that a large, secure network of peers can quickly and auto-
matically share provenance information without additional work
and in a way that preserves the integrity of the provenance record.
Although there might be other means to do accomplish this task,
permissioned distributed ledgers have additional properties that
map well onto those required of a good provenance record.
• Transaction records, which would describe workflow execu-
tions in this case, are immutable. Placement in the ledger re-
quires linking to the previous and next records in theMerkle
tree/hash list/Blockchain backing the ledger. Thus the record
cannot be changedwithout changing the entire set of records.
• Transaction records are secure. In addition to inheriting im-
mutability,which is itself a good component of security, records
are deemed valid by trusted network peers. This offers both
security through consensus and security through the “repu-
tation” of the peers.
• Transaction records can hold significant amounts of state.
Records include information about themselves, such aswhen
they were created, what the transaction was meant to do,
etc. However, contracts can be used to inject additional state
into the records, which could include root node provenance
information, or to provide extra provenance parameters to
the workflow management system on the supply side of the
transaction.
• Transaction records are uniquely identifiable in the ledger
and can be found through queries.
• Transaction records are uniformly identifiable in the ledger,
meaning that the same method to identify one transaction
can be used to uniquely identify others. Thus, at a very high
level, such a scheme would imply that the root of any prove-
nance record could be found without requiring knowledge
of the exact provenance standard used by theworkflowman-
agement systems at the nodes.
• The ledger can be walked easily in either time-backward
or time-forward order, matching either tree-based or event-
based provenance models.
These properties also suggest that ledgers would be good for
managing provenance regardless of whether or not the ledger was
distributed. (Trusted peers could be queried secretly and their con-
sensus computed locally, for example.)
3.1 Capture Model
In a distributed ledger, workflow management systems would be
peers on the network, along with clients that represent humans
and possibly other service nodes, such as nodes for staging data.
The latter point makes sense becausemoving data can itself be con-
sidered a part of setup or postprocessingworkflows. Transactions—
workflow executions—would occur when one peer in the network
asks another to execute a workflow, which would start by execut-
ing a contract to initiate the actual workflow execution. Once the
task was complete, the transaction would be tested for validity and
consensus gained on the network, at which point details about the
workflow execution would be logged. Workflow management sys-
tems could either export the entire provenance record into the con-
tract code that executed the workflow, which couldwrite it as state
in the network, or add an entry to the state that describes the prove-
nance standard used by the system and a second entry pointing to
the file/resource that contains the rest of the provenance record.
The first case has the benefit that the provenance record will never
be lost as long as the ledger exists, but the second case might be
more scalable because it requires less compute cycles and stores
less data. In practice, these options could be used together without
an obvious downside.
3.2 Access
There is little reason to consider the use of a distributed ledger for
workflow provenance that is not permissioned since presumably
all of the peers using the network would be at scientific institu-
tions of one form or another. Thus the numerous issues associated
with proof schemes, be they proof of work, stake, or time, could
be avoided by registration alone. The full transaction log could be
shared publicly as well so that others could benefit from the work,
even if they do not contribute to it. However, the question of pro-
prietary data in the ledger requires a slightly different solution.
Proprietary data or data that cannot otherwise be revealed to
the public can be stored in a distributed ledger and is not necessar-
ily a reason to choose either an open or permissioned ledger for
scientific workflows. Hyperledger, for example, solves the issue of
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proprietary network in the ledger by introducing channels [2]. Pri-
vate transactions are handled in private channels, and although
the existence of the transaction is recorded in the ledger, no state
is saved for that transaction, which hides all the secret informa-
tion. This is a nice alternative that makes it possible to share some
information while saving other information instead of completely
hidding the ledger behind permissioning or adopting another tech-
nology.
4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The goal of this work was to demonstrate compatibility between
provenance models for scientific workflows and distributed ledgers.
There might be significant benefits to using distributed ledgers for
capturing provenance because of how easily it enables sharing and
search while also mixing in some standardization.
One key question that remains is howwell provenance captured
in a distributed ledger can be used to quickly create new work-
flows based on the original. Duplicating a transaction is a rela-
tively straightforward thing and, in principle, executing it might
be straightforward as well. However, it might be necessary to in-
vestigate how the new transaction can point to the original trans-
action from which it was copied. Would it be as simple as adding
a secondary hash in the saved state that pointed to the parent? Or
would it require a “blocktree” that allowed branching instead of
solely a blockchain/hash list? In any case, the identity of the par-
ent would seem to be important provenance itself!
Another important question is how deep the provenance tree
could go. Investigating the degree towhich contracts could convert
provenance information to standard ledger state is an interesting
topic for further research since it would address compatibility is-
sues between workflow and provenance models.
Addressing these and other questions as part of an extensive
pilot project would be valuable. There are many open source dis-
tributed ledger frameworks, including the previously mentioned
Hyperledger, and a number of commercial solutions that could
keep the investigation focused on the science rather than exten-
sive software engineering. Success in this endeavor could create
an entirely new way of producing reproducible and reusable scien-
tific workflows.
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